This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
Any mistakes are our own. † Send correspondence to: Jun Zhou; Email: okonom.bonn@gmail.com 1 For instance, in Harrington (2008) , when the probability that a competition authority discovers and successfully prosecutes a cartel is sufficiently high, cartel collapses and all firms race for leniency. Harrington refers to this as the "Race-to-the-Courthouse" effect.
appear to suggest, one might be tempted to conclude, based on the fact that detection was infrequent prior to leniency introduction (Miller 2009; Hammond 2004) , that leniency created distrust among conspirators, freed up investigatory resources that would be otherwise spent identifying the reported cartel (Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005) , and enhanced the authorities' detection capabilities. This paper explores the dynamic nature of leniency application. The main objectives are to document empirically that delayed applications are a relevant phenomenon, to understand the cause of delays, and to evaluate leniency programs' effectiveness in inducing whistle-blowing. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime.
One common feature of the game theoretical literature in this area has been the restrictive assumption that conspirators apply for leniency, once they decide to do so, as soon as a cartel collapses. The validity of this assumption will be tested here. The assumption might be unsatisfactory because first, it precludes an analysis of the pattern of leniency application over time and does not provide a framework for analyzing policies concerned with delays; second, application delays are empirically important: Over three quarters of the European Commission (hereafter "EC") leniency applications by first-in applicants took place not before but after a cartel collapses; Nearly 40 percent of the applications by first-in applicants postdated cartel dissolution by at least a year; More than half of the applications by first-in applicants arrived after the "dawn raids", by which time the EC was already aware of the cartels' existence.
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This salient empirical regularity suggests that standard computations of both the conspirators' incentive to denounce a cartel and the cartel-destabilizing effect provided by leniency may be biased.
This paper provides the first independent empirical analysis of leniency application delays, from the date that a cartel collapses, to the time that the first applicant reports the cartel, and up to the closure of an antitrust investigation. Much of our extant knowledge regarding the timing of leniency application comes from antitrust officials, who consistently laud the incentives that leniency programs create for conspirators to rapidly disclose hidden cartels:
The catch is that [immunity] There are at least three reasons to view this rhetoric with skepticism, although the latest empirical evidence seems to suggest that leniency programs in the U.S. and the E.U. may have the intended effects (Miller 2009; Zhou 2012a ). First, to qualify for amnesty, firms need not report a cartel immediately upon leaving it. By holding off reporting when the other firms are currently doing so, a firm remains eligible but avoids attracting attention from antitrust authorities. Once the opportunity matures, the dead cartel can be evoked without increased antitrust surveillance; Second, because leniency is more powerful when firms fear that their accomplice will apply (Harrington 2011), antitrust authorities may have an incentive to cultivate tensions and distrust among the firms. Overstating the pace of whistle-blowing may be a way to achieve such an effect; Third, antitrust authorities in most of the jurisdictions (e.g., the U.S.
Department of Justice (hereafter "DOJ")) keep strict confidentiality regarding the details of leniency applications (including among others, their dates). Although it is possible to draw inferences in some cases, more commonly the details (or even existence) of a leniency applicant is unknowable from publicly available data (Spratling 1999; Miller 2009 ). The potentially perverse incentives in combination with a lack of institutional transparency in most of the jurisdictions helps motivate this research.
We present evidence that leniency application delays are empirically relevant using a time series of EC cartel decisions issued between October 1996 and March 2012. The time series provides data on the dates of cartel dissolution and leniency application which allow us to form 4 a relatively precise measure of application delays. We highlight the differences in delays across different leniency regimes and those during economic booms and recessions.
Reduced form, semiparametric hazard models and probit models are used and compared to alternative approaches. The models test how changes in antitrust policies and macroeconomic conditions affect the length of leniency application delays. We are able to control for the manpower of EC Directorate-General for Competition, fine reductions, cartel duration and organizational features (such as monitoring and within-cartel transfers, existence of a ringleader, etc.) and other factors that may influence applications. We find that the EC's new leniency expedites amnesty applications; and delays are shorter during recessions.
A full analysis of the problem of delayed leniency application would model jointly the cartel dissolution and the application decision. Such a model is beyond the scope of the current effort.
The process of cartel dissolution is not uninteresting, but it is explored in detail elsewhere.
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Our results may have important policy implications. Cartels impede market efficiency and harm consumer welfare. Although most jurisdictions around the world treat hardcore cartels as "[t]he most serious ... violations of competition law" (OECD 2002b), the data analyzed here indicate that the EC discovered hardcore cartels in more than 50 distinct industries across four continents over the sample period. Our results suggest that standard computations of both a conspirator's incentive to apply for leniency and the destabilizing and deterrent effects provided by the leniency programs may be biased. Assuming that conspirators report a cartel as soon as the cartel ends overstates leniency's efficacy in enhancing detection and saving enforcement resources, as more than half of the applications by first-in applicants postdated the dawn raids.
Moreover, we are not aware of any in-depth empirical analysis of this delay behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide relevant institutional background on the leniency programs. We highlight the fact that leaving a cartel provides only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for applying for leniency. We briefly review the leniency program literature, emphasizing areas where realistic consideration of leniency-application behavior can affect analysis. Section 3 presents evidence that leniency application delays are empirically relevant. We use data from the EC to show that delays are frequent and, in many instances, long. Section 4 investigates determinants of application delays. We present both hazard and probit models of delays. Section 5 provides robustness checks to our main results. Section 6 concludes by summarizing our findings and discussing policy implications. A second important common feature of the programs is that they offer partial (i.e., less than 100 percent fine reduction) but discretionary amnesty to the second and subsequent applicants.
Provided that the information reported is sufficiently novel, a late conspirator may apply for and obtain fine reductions throughout the investigation, from the date an initial inspection starts, to the time that a formal proceeding is initiated (i.e., the sending of the Statement of Objections), and up to the EC's final decision. As we report below, late applicants obtained 
Previous literature
A large and growing game-theoretical literature, starting from Motta and Polo (2003) and reviewed in Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008) , has studied the impact of leniency on cartel stability by examining conspirators' incentive to unveil a cartel. The primary force in the analyses has been that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultaneously cheat on a cartel and disclose it for reduced penalty (e.g., Motta This literature, however, suffers from a potential weakness that has thus far been ignored:
the endogeneity in the timing of leniency application and, therefore, a conspirator's incentive to report a cartel. Our results-where delays in leniency applications are frequent and long-run contrary to the prediction of all previous theoretical models which is that conspirators either confess immediately after a cartel collapses or never confess. are consistent with those presented here because they suggest that guaranteed and automatic amnesty to first applicants may be an important element of successful leniency programs.
Empirical Evidence on Leniency Application Delays

Data
We sample data from EC cartel decisions issued over the period 1996 to 2012. Our analysis restricts to cartels that are eligible for leniency, i.e., cartels whose investigation ended after July 18, 1996-the date of the old leniency introduction. 5 The EC data currently include 110 cartels investigated by the EC between July 1996 and March 2012. A rich variety of casespecific information is recorded in the data, including the start and end dates of a cartel and those of Commission investigation, whether firms applied for leniency and if so, the date of the first application in the most of the cases. 6 These are the key variables of interest in this paper. In order to isolate the effect of leniency revision from those of the other institutional changes, we restrict our sample to cartels whose first applications predate the publication of the White Paper on Damage Actions (April 2, 2008) -a major innovation in the EU's anti-cartel regime. 7 One cartel is excluded due to this restriction. Furthermore, we exclude two cartels whose investigations ended after April 2, 2008 without a firm submitting an application. As discussed earlier, conspirators could apply throughout an investigation. Therefore, the White
Paper might have affected application decisions in these cartels. Finally, we exclude 11 cartels because the dates of application is unknowable from publicly available data and it is impossible to make inferences in these cases. We refer to the 96 remaining cartels as our full sample. In 78 cartels of the full sample, firms applied for leniency. The 78 cartels are referred to as our reports sample. The main variables and model parameters are defined in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
The EC data suffers from a lack of reliable information on producer concentration. The variable has been shown to be an important determinant of cartel stability (Selten 1973 A spell in this context refers to a period of application delay, which begins at the later of the cartel's end date and the date of the leniency introduction. The first two columns of statistics in Panel A are for all delay spells, including those ended in an investigation closure and the expiration of the old leniency program; The next two columns are for spells that ended in a leniency application; The final column is for spells with positive delay durations.
[ Table 2 about here]
The results are quite stunning in terms of the prevalence of application delays, as over three-quarters of the applications by first-in applicants postdated cartel dissolution (Row 3, Column 4, Panel A). The prevalence of delays is particularly great for spells that ended before the new leniency, as over 40 percent of the applications are delayed for over a year.
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The mean value of DELAY, which includes spells that ended in an investigation or the leniency revision but not necessarily a leniency application, ranges from a low of nine months for the new leniency regime to a high value of 20 months for the old leniency.
These rather impressive statistics regarding the length of application delays may understate the importance of these concerns in the cases in which they arise. The statistics in the final column of Panel A, periods in the data and we calculate the average DELAY in each period. Panel A of Figure 1 plots the mean duration of applications delays per period; Panel B plots the medians.
[ Figure MARGIN is the average difference in fine reductions between the first and second applicants during the pervious year. This variable controls for changes in the marginal incentive that the penalty regime provides firms with to come out ahead in denouncing a cartel. Because MARGIN is not defined for spells that ended before July 18, 1997 or if there was no application in the previous year, we only have 94 observations for this variable.
The EC's Fining Guidelines provide that the "basic amount of fines"-the level of fines in absence of offsetting leniency reductions-increases with the duration of an infringement.
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Our second penalty variable, DURATION, is a cartel's life span (in months) that is proven by documented evidence. 10 The variable serves as a proxy for the scale of penalty that a conspirator would pay if he does not confess. It is perhaps by now mother's milk to industrial economists that in a repeated-game collusion is easier to sustain as players become more patient. The average annual interest rate with 3-month maturity-INTEREST -is the short-term market rate of interest generally available to borrowers. It is used as a presumptive measure of fluctuations in firms' discount factor.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Market
[ Table 3 about there]
Received industrial organization theory also suggests that business cycle timing may affect There are a number of ways that the size of cartel membership-FIRMS -could affect or be associated with cartel stability. Besides reflecting (inversely) concentration, it may also influence, among other things, the costs of monitoring and coordinating a cartel (e.g., Stigler
(1964), Dick (1996)). It is worth to note that the existence of some cartels with a large number of firms is not as paradoxical as it may appear: many cartels with a large membership are monitored and coordinated by a trade association. The basic amount also does not take into account varies aggravating and mitigating circumstances such as, among others, whether a firm was playing a leader's role and whether the firm had a limited extent of involvement. 10 We obtain similar results using suspected cartel durations. 
Finally, I include two categorical variables, INDUSTRY TYPE and MARKET-SCOPE, to
control for the effects of omitted cartel-specific characteristics (e.g., price transparency, market concentration, industry-specific cyclicality, etc.) that may be correlated with both dissolution likelihood and the included variables of interest. Table 3 , Panel B of the online Appendix reports the distribution of industry types and market scope.
Hazard model estimates of determinants of delay
The leniency application decision is analyzed most naturally in a hazard model framework. A spell in this context refers to a period of application delay, which begins at the later of the cartel's end date and the date of the leniency introduction. In what follows, we discuss two alternative empirical specifications and investigate the robustness of the results. The second specification is a generalization of the first.
Cox's (1972) semiparametric proportional hazard model is the most popular approach towards characterizing the hazard function h(t; ·).
The model is flexible enough to account for potential inappropriate distribution assumptions that may be involved in parametric methods. 12 The hazard function for spell i is
where t is the difference (in months) between the date of the first application and the later of the date of cartel dissolution and the date of the leniency introduction. x i is a vector of observed explanatory variables. The parameter vector β is the vector of coefficients, measuring the influence of observed characteristics. The term exp(x ′ i β) shifts the baseline hazard function h 0 (t), and a positive coefficient indicates that the observed characteristics increase the application hazard and reduce the delay. The model is semiparametric in that the baseline hazard h 0 (t) is a nonparametric function of time, with the influence of other observable characteristics specified assuming a particular functional form. Furthermore, the model is a proportional hazard one since the ratio of the hazard function for any group with certain observed characteristics to that of the baseline hazard equals a constant, dependent only on the observed characteristics;
i.e, h(t)/h 0 (t), the relative hazard function, is not time varying.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct leniency application delay times. Further suppose that we can rank the application times such that t 1 < t 2 < ... < t k where t j denotes the application time for the jth spell. Furthermore, let R j denote the set of spells have not applied for leniency until time t j . Then the probability that the ℓth application will take place at time t j given that some conspirators in set R j will apply for leniency at time t j is
Taking the product of the conditional probabilities in (1) yields the partial likelihood function
, with corresponding log-likelihood function
Cox's competing risks model. An investigation can end in two ways: (1) with amnesty applications prior to or during its course; or (2) without a conspirator reporting. In the latter case, we can only infer that spell durations would have continued beyond the date that the investigation ended, but was censored at the date. Moreover, in nine cartels that collapsed prior multiple cartel groups apply for leniency at the same t j ) the full partial log-likelihood is given
where β ϕ j (with ϕ j = 1, 2) is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for the different types of risk differ by a constant ratio.
Running standard Cox regression on the augmented data set gives the appropriate estimates of the regression coefficients, provided the model fit is good. The partial likelihood which results from the method is precisely the partial likelihood suggested by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for competing risks.
Hazard model estimates. Table 3 reports the competing risks Cox regression estimates of the coefficients. Unless otherwise stated, the coefficient of interest throughout the paper is that of the LENIENCY, the effect of the leniency revision on application delays.
Column (1) shows that the leniency revision immediately results in a hazard profile with shorter application delays. The estimated LENIENCY coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and corresponds to a 102 percent (exp{0.705} − 1 ≈ 102%) increase in the application hazard from the pre-revision level. Figure 3 depicts this relationship diagrammatically.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the impact of the new leniency is quite similar to that in (1) with controls for changes in macroeconomic conditions (column (2)) and the effects of market structures (column (3)). In Column (4) [Insert Table 4 Here]
[Insert Fig. 3 Here]
Probit model estimates. Our hazard models consider the marginal impact of antitrust policies and economic conditions on delay in general. But of particular concern is the impact of changes in these factors on reasonably long delays, since these are the cases that are of most relevance for both policy-making and empirical work on cartel stability and leniency application behavior. We therefore, in Table 4 , reestimate our models as probit models of the decision to delay application at least 12 months. As mentioned earlier, the mean of this dependent variable is 41.9%. Table 4 reports the probit coefficients and standard errors. We expect all coefficients to switch signs, as a positive coefficient in the probit indicates a higher likelihood of delay. This is precisely what we find. The LENIENCY coefficients remain large and significant. In particular, the new leniency introduction leads to a 116 percent decrease in LONG-DELAY s (exp{0.772}− 1 ≈ 116%). Likewise, we continue to see a positive correlation between MANPOWER and application delays (columns (10), (11) and (12)). But as in the case of the hazard models (columns (5) and (6)), the coefficients of the investigatory resource variable remain insignificant.
Thus, the probit estimates confirm the pattern of our main findings from the hazard models.
For LENIENCY, the effects are similar in magnitude to those in the hazard models, suggesting that the new leniency may play an important role in reducing long delays as well as in reducing short delays. Indeed, if we reestimate these probit models with a dummy for any delay, as opposed to a dummy for long delays, we obtain similar significant results on LENIENCY.
Additional Robustness Checks
In this section I briefly describe exercises that I conducted to see if the results above are robust to my empirical modeling assumptions. Six robustness concerns are addressed. They relate to
(1) placebo policy shocks, (2) anticipation effect, (3) alternative measure of application delays, and (4) confounding influences of the DOJ's interventions.
EC's New Leniency versus Placebo Policy Shocks
Our empirical strategy is implemented using a before-and-after comparison across groups where the date of leniency revision-February 19, 2002-is used as an exogenous shock to identify the impact of the revision. Our concern here is that if alternative shocks-i.e., placebo policiesyield a better fit to the data, then the link between leniency introductions and the time series of cartel durations might not be causal. 13 To investigate, we borrow the method of Miller (2009) and re-run the regression in column (5) of Table 3 but use alternative time breakpoints in the data and compare the maximized log-likelihoods across the different specifications.
Each points on the graphs of Figure 4 corresponds to the maximized log-likelihood of one Cox regression. The point located at zero on the horizontal axes marks the maximized loglikelihood when the shocks are imposed at the leniency revisions. The points to the left (resp. right) of zero represent the log-likelihoods when the shocks are imposed before (resp. after) February 19, 2002 . Panel A uses six-month periods. The maximized log-likelihood generated by leniency (−282.369) is greater than those generated by all but two placebo policy shocks.
The offending placebo policy that predates the leniency revision corresponds not to a fall but a sharp increase in DELAY of one spell that ended in the fifth period before February 19, 2002 .
The offending placebo policy that postdates the revision corresponds to a dramatic increase in
DELAY of one spell that ended in the fifth period following the revision. Panels B and C use three-month and twelve-month periods, respectively. The results are largely similar to that in the six-month case. In the twelve-month case, the regression fit is globally maximal when the shock is imposed at February 19, 2002.
[Insert Fig. 4 Here]
Conclusion
The social costs of cartel have motivated an extensive literature investigating the efficacy and design of anti-cartel policies. While there is a large literature on leniency application decisions, we are not aware of any previous analysis of delays in applications.
We find a high prevalence of delay in leniency application empirically that is so far overlooked by the theoretical models. Our hazard and probit modeling suggest that delays are systematically correlated with the severity of punishment and business cycles. In particular, we find support for the hypothesis that delays tend to be shorter after the new leniency introduction. But we did not find support for the hypothesis that the introduction of the EC's new leniency shortens delay. Our research has implications for the large literature on collusion, in particular the impacts of leniency on cartel stability and market efficiency. 
END DATE
Ending date of the last agreement(s) between any two (or more) cartel participants.
END DATE -2
The date that the first applicant leaves the cartel.
END DATE -3
The date of the first permanent departure from the cartel by a participant. If firms did not apply for amnesty, the difference (in months) between the date that the EC issues its prohibition decision and the later of the cartel's END DATE (resp. END DATE -2, END DATE -3) and the date of the leniency introduction.
Dependent Variables
DELAY (resp. DE- LAY -2,
LONG-DELAY
1 if DELAY is longer than one year; 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
Antitrust Policies Note.-An "observation" corresponds to a spell which is a period of application delays starting from the later of the ending date of a cartel's last agreement and the date of the leniency introduction. Note. -The table reports Note. -The table reports 
